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N this article, I discuss the recently proposed revisions of sections 2-
201 and 2-202, the statute of frauds and parol evidence provisions of
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 2, together with certain
related provisions. The statute of frauds establishes a level of formality
(or, in the case of its exceptions, a substitute for formality) with which an
agreement must be evidenced to be enforceable. The parol evidence rule
applies once it is determined that a contract, at least partly evidenced by
a record, is enforceable, limiting the evidence that may be admitted to
prove its terms. In general, I will describe the proposed revisions and the
changes in doctrine including questions that the changes may be expected
to raise. In view of the recent actions of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in deciding not to promulgate the
1999 Annual Meeting version of Revised Article 2, appointing a new
drafting committee,1 and postponing for one more year final approval of
the 2000 Annual Meeting version,2 I will also discuss whether the statute
of frauds should be retained (a question already much debated), 3 whether
both the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule should be changed
as proposed, and whether either should be further liberalized or clarified.
However, the purpose here is as much to describe what has been pro-
posed as revisions to the statute as to critique the wisdom of the current
proposals or suggest other changes.
1. See, Press Release, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws(NCCUSL) and American Law Institute (ALl), ALl and NCCUSL Announce New Draft-
ing Committee for U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A, August 18, 1999, U.C.C. at http://www.nccusl.
org/pressreleases/pr8-18-99.htm, that states:
At the annual meeting of NCCUSL in July [1999], opposition to certain sections of Arti-
cle 2 ... led the leadership of NCCUSL ... to conclude that the prospects for uniform
adoption throughout the country required additional review of some provisions. Accord-
ingly, the NCCUSL annual meeting took no action with respect to ... Article 2 ... NC-
CUSL and the ALl have now appointed the new drafting committee.... ALl Director
Lance Liebman made the following statement: The new Drafting Committee will draw
upon the version of Article 2 previously approved by the Institute as well as the current
Article 2.... We hope that a suitable and constructive resolution of the remaining issues
can ... be achieved.
2. See, Press Release, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Work Continues on Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Articles 2 and 2A, Au-
gust 15, 2000, at http://www.nccusl.org/whatsnew-newsl.htm The Revision to U.C.C. Arti-
cles 2 and 2A had been scheduled for final approval by NCCUSL at NCCUSL's Annual
Meeting in St. Augustine, Florida, July 28th through August 4th [2000], and was considered
there by the Committee of the Whole. However, NCCUSL decided to defer final approval
action by it for one more year; ... discussions with interested parties about some provi-
sions had not been concluded. Deference to these considerations seemed in order.
3. See, e.g., articles cited infra at note 10.
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I. PART A
A. SECTION 2-201. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
(THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS)
1. Introduction and Scope
After much discussion 4 the original Article 2 Drafting Committee pro-
posed the retention of the statute of frauds inU.C.C. 2-201 and the new
drafting committee carried that recommendation forward.5 The pro-
posed revisions would (i) make it applicable only to sales contracts for a
4. Between 1993 and the fall of 1996 the drafts of revised Article 2 deleted the statute
of frauds and instead provided in section 2-201 that no signed writing was necessary for the
enforceability of a contract for the sale of goods. Proposed section 2-201(a) of the March 1,
1996 draft of Revised Article 2 read: "A contract or modification thereof is enforceable,
whether or not there is a record signed by a party against whom enforcement is sought,
even if the contract or modification is not capable of performance within one year after its
making." Reporter's Note 1 to proposed section 2-201 in that March 1, 1996 draft stated in
part: "Revised Section 2-201(a) was approved by the Drafting Committee on March 6,
1993. A motion to restore the statute of frauds was rejected by a voice vote of the Com-
missioners at the 1995 Annual Meeting of NCCUSL"
At the drafting committee meeting in November 1996 the drafting committee voted to
restore the writing requirement. The Reporter's Note to proposed section 2-201 in the
May 16, 1997 draft of Revised Article 2 stated in part:
Section 2-201(a) in the November 1996 draft abolished the statute of frauds for Article 2.
This result was strongly recommended by the PEB Study Group and was approved by the
Drafting Committee on March 6, 1993. A motion to restore the statute of frauds was
rejected by a voice vote of the Commissioners at the 1995 and 1996 Annuals [sic] Meeting
of NCCUSL.
However, at the November, 1996 meeting, the Drafting Committee decided to restore
"some version" of the statute of frauds.
At their respective annual meetings in 1997 both the American Law Institute (ALI) and
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) concurred that
the statute of frauds should be retained in revised Article 2.
During the annual meeting of NCCUSL in July 1999 the Annual Meeting Draft of Re-
vised Article 2, which had been approved by the American Law Institute in its annual
meeting in May 1999, was withdrawn from consideration. The stated reasons were (1) the
agenda of the meeting was too full and had to be reduced, and (2) concern about the
uniform enactability of the revision. The Reporter and Associate Reporter of the Drafting
Committee resigned following this withdrawal. A new Drafting Committee and Reporter
were appointed, and the initial plan was to present a new revision of Article 2 to the ALl
and NCCUSL in the year 2000. Thomas J. McCarthy, Chair, Article 2 Subcommittee of
the ABA Business Law Section's U.C.C. Committee, email memo dated August 12, 1999,
copy in author's file.
Revisions to the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule provisions in Article 2
were not the prime concern behind the withdrawal of the NCCUSL 1999 Annual Meeting
draft. The proposed warranty and remedy provisions were a more significant concern, for
example.
Drafts of Revised Article 2 from January 1996 through August 2000 are available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blllulc/ulcframe.htm.
5. Except as otherwise indicated the remarks in this article are based on the 2000
NCCUSL Annual Meeting draft of proposed Article 2 in which the text of section 2-201
reads:
SECTION 2-201. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS; STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
(a) A contract for sale for the price of $5,000 or more is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless there is some record sufficient to indicate
that a contract has been made between the parties and authenticated by the
party against which enforcement is sought or by its authorized agent or bro-
ker. A record is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term
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price of $5,000 or more, (ii) harmonize the formality requirement with
the reality of electronic contracting and electronic records, (iii) provide
that the admissions exception could be satisfied by any admission made
under oath, even if not in court, (iv) render the one-year (or similar) pro-
vision of the original Statute of Frauds inapplicable to Article 2 contracts,
and (v) would eliminate the introductory phrase of original subsection (1)
("Except as otherwise provided in this section").
Original section 2-201(1) made the writing requirement applicable to a
"contract for the sale of goods."'6 Proposed section 2-201(a) just reads,
"contract for sale."'7 Does this slight change in language suggest any
change in the scope of the Article 2 statute of frauds? Proposed section
2-103(a) would continue to state that Article 2 "applies to transactions in
goods," but proposed comment 1 of section 2-103, the scope provision,
says that "contract" means contract for sale, and "sale" is defined to
mean "the passing of title to goods from the seller to the buyer for a
price."'8 So proposed section 2-201(a) would only apply to contracts for
the sale of goods, not to other transactions in goods or to the sale of
services or intangibles. 9
agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this subsection beyond
the quantity of goods shown in such record.
(b) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a record in confirmation
of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, the record satisfies the require-
ments of subsection (a) against the party receiving it unless notice of objec-
tion to its contents is given in a record within 10 days after it is received.
(c) A contract that does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (a) but
which is valid in other respects is enforceable:
(1) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and
the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances
that reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a
substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their pro-
curement; or
(2) if the party against which enforcement is sought admits in the party's
pleading, or in the party's testimony or otherwise under oath that a contract
for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph
beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(3) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or
which have been received and accepted.
(d) A contract that is enforceable under this section is not rendered unen-
forceable merely because it is not capable of being performed within one
year or any other applicable period after its making.
6. "Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for
the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker." U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1995).
7. "A contract for sale for the price of $5,000 or more is not enforceable .... § 2-
201(a), supra, note 5. (Proposed Draft 2000).
8. § 2-102(a)(36) (Proposed Draft 2000) (emphasis supplied).
9. Proposed comment 2 of Section 2-103, the scope provision, contains a useful dis-
cussion of the application of Article 2 to mixed contracts where a sale of goods forms a
part of the transaction but non-goods aspects are also included. The most challenging ex-
ample is a sale of goods with embedded computer programs.
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2. Advisability of Retaining a Sales Statute of Frauds
Of course the debate concerning whether to retain a statute of frauds
in Article 2 has been on-going in the legal literature for some time with
some arguing the statute no longer serves a useful purpose, if it ever did,
and others believing the statute remains an eminently reasonable thresh-
old requirement for enforcement of an alleged promise, that it screens
out meritless cases at an early stage.' 0 It has also been suggested that the
statute may be justified "by a reduction in externalized proof costs associ-
ated with establishing all contracts."'" While the proposed new Article 2
10. The controversy is perhaps best illustrated by the disagreement of Professors
White and Summers in their noted treatise, 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-8 (4th ed. 1995). Other recent opinions include: (against
the statute) Marc E. Szafran, A Neo-Institutional Paradigm for Contracts Formed in Cyber-
space: Judgment Day for the Statute of Frauds, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 512
(1996) (suggesting section 2-201 should be repealed because the statute has so many excep-
tions that litigation has become cumbersome and expensive); Michael Braunstein, Remedy,
Reason, and the Statute of Frauds: A Critical Economic Analysis, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 383,
431 (1989).
[Because] the writing required by the statute of frauds does not fulfill any of
the important functions of a writing requirement [including that] ... [i]t does
not provide good evidence of the existence of an agreement or of its terms, it
does not channel their actions into recognizable juridical modes, and it does
not caution the parties or give them occasion to pause about the legal conse-
quences of their actions, [the statute should be repealed];
(for the statute) John C. Ward & Kim Dockstader, Placing Article 2's Statute of Frauds in its
Proper Perspective, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 507, 522-523 (1990-1991)
Those who criticize section 2-201 for being "excepted away" or argue that the
provision is too narrow in focus, miss the primary appeal of this modern day
statute of frauds. The statute operates as it was intended, to prevent enforce-
ment of questionable or non-existent oral agreements. In situations where
the liberal writing requirement cannot even be met or where there are no
other reliable indicia of contract formation (as the exceptions to section 2-
201 contemplate), one must ask whether a plaintiff should be allowed to al-
lege that an agreement was ever reached. If the plaintiff cannot meet the
basic threshold determination of section 2-201, the inquiry must look to
whether any agreement ever existed in the first place, or whether the parties
ever passed the stage of speculation in their initial negotiations. Under such
circumstances, one party's belated, after-the-fact perceptions of oral conver-
sations should not be considered persuasive evidence of contract formation.
Defendants should be entitled to the threshold protection that the statute
offers, particularly where a liberal and less demanding standard is used for
such a determination.
David J. Gass, Michigan's U.C.C. Statute of Frauds and Promissory Estoppel,
74 MICH. BAR. J. 524, 526 (1995) ("[The statute of frauds] encourages parties
to commit their negotiated affairs to writing and impresses upon them the
importance of their agreement. This is a worthy goal which is consistent with
the layperson's idea that serious contracts must be committed to writing or
they are not enforceable.")
This last observation suggests that the channeling function has in fact been
successful to the point that people commonly (though erroneously) believe
there must be a writing or there is no enforceable contract. Eliminating the
statute might thus pose a trap for the unwary who might continue to believe
they are not bound to a promise unless there is a signed writing.
11. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE AND STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW, DOMESTIC AND INTER-
NATIONAL, 123-24 (1999). In brief the suggestion is that it may be more costly to litigate
over and prove contracts not evidenced by an authenticated record than contracts which
are, and that some significant portion of these costs may be borne by third parties in the
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retains a statute of frauds, it tips its hat both ways. The price threshold is
significantly higher so that fewer agreements would be covered, the for-
mality requirement would be amended to approve authenticated elec-
tronic or other records, and the exceptions would be slightly broadened.
The suggested comments of the latest version do not reveal why the deci-
sion was made to retain a statute of frauds. The only traditional justifica-
tion for the statute of frauds mentioned in the proposed comments is the
so-called evidentiary function: "All that is required is that the writing af-
ford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real
transaction.' 2 Although discussions at the drafting committee meetings
included the matters indicated in note 12 of this article, in the end the
original drafting committee, as well as, the new one may simply have con-
cluded it was more likely a uniform revised Article 2 could be enacted in
the states if it retained a statute of frauds.13 Practicing attorneys, and
perhaps even more their clients, may rely [albeit erroneously] on the for-
form of tax revenues paid to support the judicial system and in the form of delay in having
other disputes adjudicated. Since the contracting parties do not bear all proof costs, they
contract (and litigate) without taking into account the full social costs of their behavior. A
Statute of Frauds, by requiring a legally sufficient memorandum as a condition of enforce-
ability, shifts some of the proof costs otherwise borne by third parties ex post to the con-
tracting parties negotiating the dispute ex ante. It does so by placing on the parties the cost
of producing written evidence prior to litigation as a condition of enforceability.
The authors' point, however, is not that this is a sufficient justification, but that it would
be useful to have empirical information on the internal and external costs discussed to
inform a debate on the sufficiency of this possible justification.
12. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (Proposed Draft 2000). This sentence is a direct quote of the
second sentence of original Comment 1. Cf., Karl Llewellyn's statement that the purpose
for the statute of frauds was "to require some objective guaranty, other than word of
mouth, that there really has been some deal." Speech given by Karl Llewellyn before the
New York Law Revision Commission, Memorandum Replying to the Report and Memoran-
dum of Task Group I of the Special Committee of the Commerce and Industry Association
of New York, Inc., on the Uniform Commercial Code, quoted in 1 New York State Law
Revision Commission Report 106, 119 (1954) (emphasis omitted).
That other justifications were considered is apparent from the original Reporters' notes.
In a memo to the Drafting Committee and Observers, dated May 1, 1997 Reporter Richard
Speidel discussed the changes contained in the accompanying May 16, 1997 Draft of Re-
vised Article 2. Concerning section 2-201 Professor Speidel wrote:
1. Some History: The 1996 Annual Meeting (faced with a unanimous Drafting Commit-
tee) again rejected a motion to restore the statute of frauds. The vote was 65-52. The
Drafting Committee, in November 1996, however, agreed that some version of current 2-
201 should be restored and a draft section appeared in the March 1997 Draft.
Why this reversal? Assuming that a statute of frauds is not needed in sales contracts to
weed out perjured claims (and that use of the defense often promotes fraud), several rea-
sons are given to retain the statute: (1) Article 2 should be consistent with [Articles] 2A
and 2B [now the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act] which have statutes of
frauds; (2) The presence of the statute tends to channel behavior toward reducing agree-
ments to writing; and (3) The statute of frauds defense is a proxy for resolving contract
formation issues on a summary judgment motion.
The Reporters are not persuaded. Professor Caroline Brown, who has just completed
the Corbin volume on the statute of frauds, has concluded: "It is impossible to read the
huge body of case law without becoming convinced that the statute's role is principally an
evasive device for contract breakers." If so, why retain it?
13. This impression comes in part from the author's observing a number of drafting
committee meetings between 1993 and 1998, and in part from NCCUSL's own statements.
See NCCUSL, supra note 1 at http://www.NCCUSL.org/pressreleases/pr8-18-99.htm; see
also supra text accompanying note 4.
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mality in many cases as marking the point at which discussions have rip-
ened into binding promises, and there is an expectation that some sort of
formality requirement will be retained. It is apparent the current pro-
posed revision is a conservative compromise in that it retains a formality
requirement, which under the revision could be satisfied electronically,
but only slightly broadens the exceptions and leaves a number of issues or
conflicts among cases under the current statute unresolved.
The basic questions are: (i) is there a category of cases involving sales
of goods where we desire more than mere oral evidence of the making of
an agreement, and (ii) in those cases, if they can be identified, what types
of corroboration of the oral evidence are sufficient. Our existing Article
2 statute of frauds identifies the cases by the price of the goods and re-
quires corroboration either by a signed writing or an "exception" whose
facts are thought to furnish sufficient corroboration. It is not clear that
doing away with a "signed writing" requirement (now an "authenticated
record" requirement) would diminish the volume of litigation this area
has produced. Instead, the litigation would probably continue, focused
more on whether an agreement was made, even if not evidenced by a
record, and on what the terms were. But with the minimum standards to
satisfy the current statute of frauds these are already actively litigated
issues. It may be correct that the statute of frauds reduces litigation by
discouraging the filing of cases, where it is clear the statute's require-
ments could not be satisfied, and permits the early dismissal of meritless
cases which cannot satisfy the requirements; and it may also be true that
persons dealing in goods commonly believe there must be a sufficient
writing (or record) or there is no enforceable contract. 14
The author thinks there are three sufficient reasons for retaining a stat-
ute of frauds: (1) the legitimate political concern of whether the states
would uniformly adopt a revised Articled 2 with no statute of frauds,15
(2) the possibility that it reduces litigation or at least permits early dismis-
sal of cases without merit, 16 and (3) the advisability of the law following
the reasonable expectations of people in the marketplace so as not to
pose a trap for those unaware of changes contrary to their expectations.' 7
But the author readily admits that these reasons all rest on assumptions
that are difficult or impractical to verify empirically.18
14. See WALTER & DOCKSTADER, supra note 10, at 522-23. (discussing articles in favor
of retaining the Article 2 statute of frauds). note 10.
15. See supra, notes 1 and 4.
16. See Part A 12, infra.
17. See, GASS, supra note 10.
18. Of course, it might be interesting in the academic sense if half the states would
enact a revised Article 2 with a statute of frauds and the other half would enact a revised
version without one, and this might over time provide sufficient empirical data to verify or
deny the second and third assumptions. But the potential cost of such nonuniformity
surely outweighs the value of such an experiment. The same is true for the first assump-
tion. Revised Article 2 could be promulgated without a statute of frauds so empirical ob-
servations could be made on its uniform enactability, but the commercial cost of the
experiment could outweigh its value if a significant group of states added nonuniform au-
thenticated writing or record requirements. It seems less likely that a significant group of
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3. Contracting through Electronic Media
Historically, the statute of frauds could be called the "writing require-
ment" because, with certain exceptions, it mandated a signed writing for
an agreement to be enforceable. The arrival of contracting through elec-
tronic media including Internet sales raised serious questions about
whether the electronic records of such transactions would satisfy the writ-
ing requirement, and these questions are addressed in definitions of two
new terms incorporated in the proposed revision. "Record" is a new
term broader than "writing," which it includes, and intended to make it
possible to satisfy the statute electronically.' 9 "Authenticate" is further
new term broader than "sign," which it includes, and again intended to
make it possible to satisfy the statute electronically and to validate digital
signatures. 20 The proposed statute would require "some record ... au-
thenticated by the party against which enforcement is sought. .,21 Thus
an "authenticated record" requirement would replace and modernize the
traditional "signed writing" requirement before a contract within the
scope of the proposed statute would be enforceable. Clearly this mod-
ernization of the statute is necessary and overdue.
4. The $5,000 "Triggering" Price
The proposed requirement for an authenticated record would only ap-
ply to contracts for the price of $5,000 or more. The $500 price in original
Article 2 has been increased to reflect changes in the cost of living over
the last fifty years since the original version was drafted. In fact $500 in
value was the level set for the statute of frauds to apply under the Uni-
form Sales Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1906, so an upward adjustment to $5,000 seems
appropriate.2 2 Certainly for all contracts at that price level or above it
seems generally worthwhile for the parties to reduce their agreement to
an authenticated record. One authority has stated "[t]he idea of such a
states would deviate from the current proposal and enact a nonuniform version repealing
the statute of frauds.
19. Proposed section 2-102(a)(34) states "Record means information that is inscribed
on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable
in perceivable form."
20. Proposed section 2-102(a)(1) states (1) "Authenticate" means (i) to sign, or (ii) to
execute or otherwise adopt a symbol, or encrypt or similarly process a record in whole or
in part, with present intent of the authenticating person to identify the person or to adopt
or accept a record or term.
21. See U.C.C. § 2-201(a) (Proposed Draft 2000). note 5.
22. Section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act provided in part: "(1) A contract to sell or a
sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars or upwards shall
not be enforceable by action unless ... some note or memorandum in writing.., be signed
by the party to be charged ... " As to how this amount was chosen, Professor Williston, the
Reporter for the Uniform Sales Act, having reviewed the £10 amount of the original stat-
ute and the various levels which had been adopted in the United States, merely said, "It
should be noticed that at the time when the amount was originally fixed in the English
statute £10 meant a great deal more money than it does today. It was deemed wise in
fixing the amount in the Uniform Sales Act to set the limit at $500." 1 SAMUEL WILLIS-
TON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS 173 (Baker, Voorhis, & Co., rev. ed.1948).
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limit is not a reflection of de minimis non curat lex, but is based on the
sound notion that the economy would suffer if small transactions were
unenforceable unless put in writing. 12 3 Whatever limit is set for the stat-
ute to apply will seem arbitrary in some cases. There will be contracts
priced above that level where the parties might not find it cost effective to
use a record and contracts below that level where it would be cost effec-
tive to use a record; and the economy might not suffer significantly if the
cutoff for small transactions was set at $3,000 or $4,000, since contracting
parties may always determine for themselves whether it is cost effective
to reduce a contract to a record. But $5,000 does not seem too low of an
amount to set the triggering amount, and it is probably not too high when
it is remembered what $500 was worth in goods early in this century when
it was selected as the original price level.2 4 An adjustment is long
overdue.
5. Sufficiency of the Record
Under original section 2-201 it has generally been held that there were
three requirements for a writing to be sufficient: (1) it had to evidence a
contract for sale of goods, (2) it had to be signed by the party against
whom enforcement was sought, and (3) it had to specify a quantity.2 5 The
third requirement did not expressly come from the text of the statute,
which merely said the agreement was not enforceable beyond the quan-
tity of goods shown in the writing. This could have been read to mean
that a writing which otherwise evidenced a contract was sufficient and
that the quantity term could have been proven by extrinsic evidence like
any other term not covered by the writing.2 6 However, original comment
1 contains a sentence, which reads, "The only term which must appear is
the quantity term which need not be stated accurately but recovery is
limited to the amount stated," and a paragraph, which reads, "Only three
definite and invariable requirements as to the memorandum are made by
this subsection. First, it must evidence a contract for the sale of goods;
second, it must be 'signed,' . . . and third, it must specify a quantity."'27
23. 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, § 2-201:02
(West 1992.). The idea here is that for smaller transactions the costs of reducing them to
writing may be greater than the benefit obtained (avoiding the risks of nonenforcement or
of enforcement of terms different from those actually agreed to).
24. There is a Consumer Price Index table and calculator going back to 1913 at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site, http://www.Minneapolisfed.org/economy/
calc/cpihome.html. This site reveals that $500 in 1952, when the U.C.C. was first promul-
gated, was about $3,100 in 1999. The earliest year for which this web site has data is 1913;
$500 in that year was about $8,400 in 1999. In 1913 the Uniform Sales Act, which also had
a $500 triggering amount for the statute of frauds, was still in its youth, not having been
adopted yet in all states. This seems to identify $5,000 as within the appropriate range for
the revised statute of frauds.
25. See, e.g., Roboserve, Ltd, v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441 (1948) U.C.C.(llth
Cir. 1991).
26. 1 WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 61, n. 12.
27. U.C.C. § 2-201, cmt. 1 (1995) (emphasis added).
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This has become the standard reading of the section,28 and the proposed
revision retains this previously perceived requirement for a quantity
term.29 In so doing the new revision ignores the advice of Professor Caro-
line Brown [formerly Bruckel], who recently rewrote the Corbin volume
on the Statute of Frauds, and who argued in a previous article that a
quantity term should not be required for a record to be sufficient.30
The revision presumably would not disturb other well-established rules
concerning the sufficiency of the record under original section 2-201, such
as that a series of records may be read together to satisfy the statute.31
Nor would it change the rule that the presence of an authenticated record
does not of itself establish the terms of the contract, or even that there
was in fact a contract.32
The revision also leaves the open question what type or how much of a
record is "sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made between
the parties?" 33 As White and Summers put it, "Does 'sufficient to indi-
cate' imply a standard of proof stronger then, equivalent to, or weaker
than 'by the balance of probabilities?" 341n other words would the record
offered in satisfaction of the statute be sufficient if its effect is merely to
28. See 2 HAWKLAND, supra note 23, § 2-201:04.
29. The second sentence of Proposed section 2-201(a) reads: "A record is not insuffi-
cient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not
enforceable under this subsection beyond the quantity of goods shown in such record."
This is identical to original section 2-201(1), except that "record" has been substituted for
"writing."
The third paragraph of proposed comment 1 is substantially the same as the third para-
graph of current Official Comment 1:
Only three definite and invariable requirements as to the memorandum are
made by subsection (a). First, it must evidence a contract for the sale of
goods; second, it must be "authenticated," a word which includes a signature
and also includes any symbol or encryption process executed or adopted for
the purpose of identifying the authenticating party (Section 2-201(a)(1)); and
third, it must specify a quantity. [Emphasis added.]
Similarly, the first paragraph of proposed Comment 1 substantially follows the first para-
graph of original Comment 1 and retains the sentence which reads: "The only term which
must appear is the quantity term which need not be accurately stated but recovery is lim-
ited to the amount stated."
30. Bruckel, The Weed and the Web: Section 2-201's Corruption of The U.C.C.'s Sub-
stantive Provisions-The Quantity Problem, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 811. See also, Advent
Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1990), which cited this article approvingly
for the position that a writing, which omitted a quantity term, could be sufficient. This case
also acknowledges frequent criticism of the statute of frauds as a means of creating fraud
and counsels "courts to be careful in construing its provisions so that undesirable rigidity
does not result in injustice." Id. at 677.
31. Roboserve, Ltd., v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d at 1448.
32. Cf, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE AND STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW, DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL, 121 (1999), "Satisfaction of the Statute of Frauds is one thing. The exis-
tence of an enforceable agreement is another, distinct matter .... Satisfying Article 2's
Statute of Frauds allows the case to go forward to the fact-finder. But the fact-finder still
might find that there is no sales contract."
See also Advent Sys., 925 F.2d at 677 ( "It is also clear that a sufficient writing merely
satisfies the statute of frauds under the Code, i.e., it does not, in itself, prove the terms of
the contract") (Citing J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACrS, § 74, p. 337 (3d ed. 1990).)
33. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE AND STEVEN D. WALT, supra note 32 at 124-32.
34. 1 WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 64.
[Vol. 54
2001] STATUTE OF FRAUDS & PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 877
make it more probable that there was an oral agreement than it would be
in the absence of the offered record; or must the offered record make it at
least as probable as not that there was an agreement; or must the record
have enough weight or evidentiary value to make it more probable than
not that there was an oral agreement? 35 The cases are not unified, al-
though the majority rule is apparently that the first interpretation is cor-
rect: the record is sufficient if it merely increases the probability that
there was an agreement. 36 It is possible to argue that retaining the re-
quirement for a quantity term signals that the record must at least be
sufficient to make it as probable as not that there was an oral agreement
(the probabilities are at least evenly balanced). An authenticated record
without a quantity term might still contain enough evidentiary value to
make it more probable that there was an oral agreement than it would be
in the absence of such a record, even if the probabilities were not yet
evenly balanced. It would be unfortunate, and no doubt unintended by
the new drafting committee, if retention of the quantity requirement were
read this way. While the approach of the current proposed draft is con-
servative, it does liberalize the statute of frauds requirements by making
it possible to satisfy them with an authenticated electronic record and by
slightly loosening the exceptions. There is no indication of any intent to
tighten the requirements for the sufficiency of the authenticated record or
in any other way.
6. The Merchant's Confirmation Exception
Original section 2-201(2) contains an exception to the requirement that
the writing (record) had to be signed (authenticated) by the person
against whom enforcement is sought. If both parties to an agreement
were merchants and one sent the other a written confirmation of the con-
tract which was received within a reasonable time, that confirmation
would satisfy the statute as long as it (i) would have been enforceable
against (signed by) the sending merchant, (ii) it was received by the other
merchant who had reason to know its contents, (iii) it satisfied the re-
quirements of subsection (1), and (iv) the receiving merchant did not give
written notice of objection to the contents of the writing within ten days
after receipt.37 The proposed revision retains this exception in 2-201(b),
35. See CLAYTON P. GILLErE AND STEVEN D. WALT, supra note 32, pp. 127-133.
36. See Charles D. Onafry, The Merchant's Exception to the Uniform Commercial
Code's Statute of Frauds, 32 VILL. L. REV. 133, 171-80 (1987).
37. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1995). The purpose of the exception is to prevent the unfair
advantage to the recipient, who would otherwise have in effect an option to enforce against
the sender if market conditions made it advantageous while the recipient would not be
required to perform if market conditions went the other way. Bazak Int'l. Corp. v. Mast
Indus., Inc., 535 N.E.2d 633, 538 N.Y.S.2d 503, 637 (1989). This case also discussed what is
required for a confirmatory writing (record) to satisfy original section 2-201(2), holding in
essence that it must merely satisfy section 2-201(1), affording a basis for believing there
was a real transaction and need not have explicit words of confirmation or reference to the
oral agreement. Id. This is the majority rule according to Charles D. Onafry, supra note
36, at 173, and is consistent with the position that relatively little evidentiary value is re-
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but with "writing" changed to "record."
Under original section 2-201 the question of whether or when farmers
would be merchants has been especially troublesome. 38 While the text of
proposed 2-201(b) contains nothing addressing this issue, the second par-
agraph of proposed Comment 4 states:
A merchant includes a person "that by occupation purports to
have knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in
the transaction." (Section 2-102(a)(30) [emphasis in original]. Thus,
a professional or a farmer should be considered a merchant because
the practice of objecting to an improper confirmation ought to be
familiar to any person in business."'39
This proposed comment focuses on part of the definition of
"merchant" retained in the revision with only minor, stylistic changes
from the original.40 This in turn seems to be a more precise statement of
a concept from the second paragraph of comment 2 of original 2-104 to
the effect that almost anyone in business would know about answering
mail;41 but the proposed new comment instead defines the relevant busi-
ness practice as that of objecting to an improper confirmation. The intent
here is to draw the courts' focus away from the extent of the particular
farmer's experience with the commodity involved and instead direct that
focus to the relevant business practice of answering mail, especially mail
which appears to be an improper confirmation of a contract. 42 This
change of focus seems to be correct. Even a farmer who is selling corn
for the first time should be familiar with the common business practice
and expectation that mail will be answered, especially mail that purports
to confirm an oral agreement the farmer did not make or to confirm
quired to satisfy the statute or its exceptions. See also GILLETTE AND WALT, supra note 32,
at 127-33, and notes 31-34 supra, and related text.
38. See Onafry, supra note 36, at 145-50 (discussing the split among the cases on this
question and a suggestion as to the correct approach). See also Colo.-Kan. Grain Co. v.
Reifschneider, 817 P.2d 637 (Colo. App. 1991).
39. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt.4 (Proposed Draft 2000).
40. The proposed revised definition in section 2-102(a)(30) reads:
"Merchant" means a person that deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
its occupation holds itself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to which such knowledge or
skill may be attributed by its employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary that by its occupation holds itself out as having such knowledge
or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-2102(a)(30) (Proposed Draft 2000).
41. "Sections 2-201(2) ... dealing with the statute of frauds,... [and] confirmatory
memoranda rest on the normal business practices which are or ought to be typical of and
familiar to any person in business. For purposes of these sections almost every person in
business would, therefore, be deemed to be a 'merchant' under the language 'who ... by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices ...
involved in the transaction . . .' since the practices involved in the transaction are non-
specialized business practices such as answering mail." U.C.C. § 2-104, cmt. 2 (1995).
42. See Onafry, supra note 36, at 148-50, (note especially the discussion of Cont'l.
Grain v. Harbach, 400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. 11. 1975), which held the farmer was a merchant
because he was familiar with the specific confirmation practices of oral forward contracts).
Onafry approved the holding but questioned the rationale on the basis that the comment
indicated the business practice was merely that of answering mail. Id.
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terms different from those the farmer did make. Thus the farmer's failure
to answer may be taken either as an assent to the confirmation or as a
failure to protect the farmer's own interests, both circumstances justifying
an adverse result. If followed, this proposed comment should encourage
courts to rule more frequently that farmers are merchants in these cases.
The proposed revisions also do not address the questions of what is a
"record in confirmation" or what must be contained in a record giving
"notice of objection." But to the extent these questions would depend on
the evidentiary value of the offered record, the same quantum of value
should be required for a record to be a confirmation or an objection as
would be required for the record to be "sufficient to indicate that a con-
tract has been made" under Subsection (a). 43
7. The Specially Manufactured Goods Exception
The specially-manufactured-goods exception is retained; proposed sub-
section 2-201(c)(1) restates the original language, except for minor stylis-
tic changes. 44
8. The Admissions Exception
The admissions exceptions is retained in proposed subsection 2-
201(c)(2) 45 and expanded to apply to admissions made not just in plead-
ings or testimony in court, but "otherwise under oath," e.g., in deposi-
tion.46 The proposed revision does not deal directly with one of the more
challenging issues under the original admissions exception: Is the propo-
nent of the alleged contract entitled to conduct discovery in the hope of
eliciting an admission of the contract from the opponent before having
the case dismissed on motion because of the bar of the statute.47 For the
43. See GaLETIr AND WALT, supra note 32, at 128-32 (discussing these issues under
original section 2-201(b)). See also text supra related to notes 33-35.
44. Proposed section 2-201(c)(1) reads:
(c) A contract that ["which" in original] does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (a) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable:
(1) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's busi-
ness and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under
circumstances that ["which" in original] reasonably indicate that the
goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their
manufacture or commitments for their procurement....
U.C.C. § 2-201(c)(1) (Proposed Draft 2000).
45. U.C.C. 2-201(c)(2) (Proposed Draft 2000). See note 5, supra, for text of statute.
46. Subsection 2-201(3)(b) of the original Article 2 statute of frauds provides that a
contract otherwise valid, but which does not meet the signed writing requirement, is still
enforceable "if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testi-
mony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not en-
forceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted. U.C.C.
§ 2.201(3)(b)(1995) (Emphasis added).
47. See Michael J. Herbert, Procedure and Promise: Rethinking the Admissions Excep-
tion to the Statute of Frauds under the U. C. C. Article 2, 2A, and 8, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 203,
235 (1992) (If the plaintiff is able to impose such heavy costs on the defendant that the
defendant will be pressured into a settlement the defendant is neither spared the costs of
litigation nor relieved of liability to the plaintiff. Suppose a plaintiff alleges an oral agree-
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statute to have any real significance it must make it possible to obtain an
early dismissal on motion of cases likely to be without merit because they
could not satisfy even the simple requirements for an authenticated re-
cord or the broadened exceptions. Permitting discovery to angle for an
admission deprives the statute of any importance as a filter to prevent the
imposition of heavy costs just to deal with what are likely to be meritless
allegations of oral agreements.
Additionally, the proposed revision furnishes no guidance on what is
an admission, 48 but adequate guidance probably can be provided only by
a developed body of case law.
9. The "Part Performance" Exception
The former exception for "goods for which payment has been made
and accepted or which have been received and accepted ' 49 is proposed to
be retained in its original form, so that the contract would only be en-
forceable as to the quantity of goods accepted or for which payment had
been received. This is in keeping with the proposed revision of subsec-
tion 2-201(a) which still provides that the contract is not enforceable be-
yond the quantity of goods, if any, shown in the record; it is also
consistent with the retention of language from the original comments
stating that a quantity term is required for the writing to be sufficient.5 0
10. The Estoppel Exception
In addition to the express exceptions contained in the statute, a num-
ber of courts have held that a proponent of an alleged oral agreement
who establishes the elements of estoppel may overcome the bar of the
statute of frauds.51 Courts permitting estoppel as an additional exception
to the statute differ on whether the elements that must be established are
those of equitable estoppel or promissory estoppel, and the label used by
the courts frequently provides little help. .52 B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather
ment, a breach by the defendant, and damages of $50,000. If a court permits the plaintiff to
go to trial in an attempt to elicit an admission, the costs to the defendant will be substan-
tial. Suppose that those costs would be $10,000. The defendant might be will advised to
settle for $7,500. If . . .the defendant does not admit the making of a contract, it is the
purpose of the statute to protect him from having to litigate the issue of fact, except in
cases where the plaintiff can produce a written memorandum of the sort that the statute
requires or otherwise satisfy the statutory requirements.)(quoting 2 CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS, § 320, at 153 (1950). Presumably the potential cost of enduring discovery could
also pressure a defendant into settling a case in which an agreement was not in fact
reached.
48. See 1 WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 2-5, (discussing procedural admis-
sions and adverse credibility determinations, for example); see also GILLETrE WALT, supra
note 11 (discussing whether various statements are admissions).
49. U.C.C. 2-201(3)(c)(1995).
50. See supra, Part A 5 of this article.
51. See cases collected at 1 WHIm AND SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 2-6.
52. For example, in a case involving an alleged oral agreement for sale of gasoline and
fuel oil the court said:
Contrary to [defendant's] assertion, Texas courts have held that the doctrine
of promissory estoppel may be asserted against the requirements of the stat-
[Vol. 54
2001] STATUTE OF FRAUDS & PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 881
Shield Mfg., Inc.5 3 is a good, recent example of a case allowing promis-
sory estoppel to avoid the Article 2 statute of frauds. The doctrine is
described in that case in a quote from Judge Richard Posner: "If an un-
ambiguous promise is made in circumstances calculated to induce reli-
ance, and it does so, the promisee if hurt as a result can recover
damages."'54 The case describes equitable estoppel as a "close relative...
a tort doctrine that requires proof of misrepresentation. '55
The text of the proposed revision to section 2-201 contains no reference
to estoppel as an additional exception to the authenticated record re-
quirement, but the introductory phrase of original section 2-201(1) ("Ex-
cept as otherwise provided in this section") has been deleted.5 6 In the
past some courts and commentators have read this clause this clause as
suggesting estoppel principles were not applicable to section 2-201. 57
Proposed comment 2 explains:
The phrase "Except as otherwise provided in this section" has
been deleted from subsection (a). This means that the statement in
subsection (c) of three statutory exceptions to subsection (a) does
not preclude the possibility that a promisor will be estopped to raise
the statute-of-frauds defense in appropriate cases. 58
This proposed comment mentions estoppel without specifying whether
the intended reference is to equitable or promissory estoppel. If this or a
similar comment is retained in the revision, courts should not read it as
foreclosing the use of equitable estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds in
cases involving misrepresentation, especially in view of the fact that some
courts have historically required misrepresentation as an element of so-
called promissory estoppel sufficient to overcome the absence of an au-
thenticated record. The deletion of this clause 59 from section 2-201 and
ute of frauds .... But those courts have also held that the remedy is limited
to those cases in which the complaining party relied on an oral promise to
furnish a written contract that complied with the statute of frauds .... Thus,
a party asserting the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the statute of
frauds must not only satisfy the requirements of the doctrine, but must also
show that the promisor either misrepresented that the statute of frauds had
been satisfied, or promised to sign a written agreement.
Adams v. Petrade Int'l., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696, 707 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1988)(Emphasis added.) Recovery based on a misrepresentation that the statute of frauds
had been satisfied would technically be on the theory of equitable estoppel, not promissory
estoppel.
53. 829 P.2d 809 (Wyo. 1992).
54. Id. at 813 (quoting Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 462 (7th Cir.1986)); see
also A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium For Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Group, Inc.,
725 F.2d 1140, 1142 (7th Cir.1984) (discussing the overlap between promissory and equita-
ble estoppel).
55. B & W Glass, 829 P.2d at 813.
56. U.C.C. § 2-201(a)(Proposed Draft 2000).
57. See Futch v. James River-Norwalk, Inc., 722 F.Supp. 1395 (S.D.Miss.1989), aff'd,
887 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir.1989), and 1 WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 10, (argument of
Professor White at end of § 2-6).
58. U.C.C. § 2-201, cmt. 2 (Proposed Draft 2000).
59. "Except as otherwise provided in this section" U.C.C. § 2 -201(a) (Proposed Draft
2000).
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the inclusion of a new comment along the lines of the one proposed
would invite courts applying the revised text to use estoppel to avoid in-
justice from a rigid application of the statute of frauds.60 Though some
might prefer to have the revision in the text rather than the comments, it
may be just as well to deal with the issue in the way chosen here. It gives
courts the flexibility to continue to develop the law in this area, where
trying to deal with the issue in the text of the statute might lead to an
attempt to specify appropriate situations for estoppel, producing the very
rigidity which estoppel helps avoid. Placing in the comments the sugges-
tion that estoppel should be available might also make it more likely the
revision would be uniformly adopted. Some states, which have case law
holding estoppel inapplicable to section 2-201, might be reluctant to
adopt a statutory repeal of that rule, but might be more receptive over
time to further guidance in the comments.
11. The "One-Year" Statute of Frauds
Proposed new subsection 2-201(d) would make it clear that the so-
called "one-year" statute of frauds is not applicable to invalidate con-
tracts that would otherwise be enforceable under the proposed revision.61
The proposed comment cites C. R. Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Properties,
Inc.,62 which discusses the lack of satisfactory rationale for this portion of
the statute and also the lengths to which courts have gone in attempting
to avoid its application. There have been several cases in which the issue
was raised whether an oral agreement which satisfied original section 2-
201 could still be unenforceable because it was within the one-year provi-
sion of a state's general statute of frauds and did not satisfy that provi-
sion's more particular requirements. Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel
Corporation63 is an example. In Roth the contract for sale of steel satis-
fied the admissions exception to section 2-201(3)(b) but would not satisfy
the one-year statute, which contained no admissions exception and which
required a memorandum containing the "essential terms of the agree-
ment expressed with such clarity that they are understandable without
the aid of parol evidence."'64 The court held that the Article 2 statute of
frauds provision was a special statute that was in irreconcilable conflict
with the general statute of frauds and that the special statute, section 2-
201, would prevail as an exception to the general statute; hence the con-
60. This is the approach of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
§ 139(1)(1981).
61. The original statute of frauds, making certain alleged contracts unenforceable un-
less evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged or his agent, applied to "any
agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making
thereof." An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c.3, § 4(5) (1677). As a
proposed comment indicates some states have enacted a variation on this provision chang-
ing the period to longer than one year, hence the language "any other applicable period."
U.C.C. § 2-201, cmt. 8 (Proposed Draft).
62. 600 A.2d 772 (Conn. 1991).
63. 705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.1983).
64. Id. at 141, n.12.
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tract was enforceable since it satisfied 2-201. Roth was cited in AP Pro-
pane, Inc. v. Sperbeck,65 as stating the prevailing view on the question;
however, Roth itself cites a case apparently to the contrary, 66 so it would
be useful for the revision to remove any doubt about the applicability of
the one-year provision. Roth and the proposed revision certainly appear
to reach the correct outcome. If the Article 2 statute of frauds or its
exceptions is satisfied, then the policies behind the requirement for an
authenticated record are also satisfied; nothing extra is gained by requir-
ing compliance with more than one statute of frauds.
12. Disposing of Meritless Cases on Motion
As mentioned above in Part A 2, one suggested justification for the
statute of frauds is that it permits an early dismissal of meritless cases.
The initial issues for any contract enforcement are whether a binding
promise was actually made and whether it was sufficiently definite and
certain as to its subject matter and terms to be capable of enforcement. 67
If contract formation is at issue these matters require a factual investiga-
tion, which will frequently prevent disposition of the case on motion for
summary judgment. It will not be possible to decide the formation issue
from summary judgment affidavit evidence where there is a dispute as to
what the parties said and the context in which it was said during their
negotiations. If there is a requirement for an authenticated record and a
qualifying record exists, it will usually prevent disposal of the case on
motion for summary judgment because plaintiff will be afforded the op-
portunity to prove the existence and terms of a contract.
More importantly from the viewpoint of proponents of the statute of
frauds, not only is the absence of a qualifying authenticated record, or
facts satisfying an exception to the requirement, frequently an indication
that the parties had not yet reached an agreement, the issue of the exis-
tence of an authenticated record can usually be handled by motion for
summary judgment or motion to dismiss. An affidavit can attest to the
validity of the authenticated record if one is offered, and the court can
examine the record to determine if it meets the statute's minimal stan-
dards. Thus the question whether there is a sufficient authenticated re-
cord operates substantially as a proxy for the issue whether an agreement
was made. 68 This permits the courts to dispose of many cases involving
alleged agreements on motion for summary judgment or to dismiss where
the defense of the statute of frauds is available and the proponent of the
alleged contract cannot meet the statute's requirements. This in turn ad-
65. 555 N.Y.S.2d 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
66. Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co., Inc. v. Cont'l. Oil, 534 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir.1976).
67. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, 112 (2d ed. 1990).
68. I am not ignoring the fact that the presence of an authenticated record that is
sufficient under the statute still does not establish that an agreement was made. See supra,
note 30 and accompanying text. However, the presence of a record sufficient under the
statute does at least make it more probable that an agreement was made than it would be
in the absence of a record.
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dresses both concerns of efficiency and fairness: it is efficient to dispose
of unworthy cases early on motion without having to go through a trial
with its attendant preparation phase. It may also prevent the unfair out-
come of defendants settling cases in which they did not in fact make a
promise, just to avoid the expense of trial and the risk of an adverse
result.6
9
The proposed revision generally retains this efficiency as well as fair-
ness, except it does not address whether the proponent of an alleged oral
agreement is entitled to engage in discovery before the case is dismissed
on motion. A closely related question has already been discussed by
Judge Richard Posner in DF Activities Corporation v. Brown,70 in which
the defendant moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 71 to dismiss the suit
on an alleged oral contract for sale of a chair designed by Frank Lloyd
Wright on the grounds that the suit was barred byU.C.C. section 2-201.
Attached to the motion was the defendant's sworn affidavit that there was
no agreement to sell the chair to the plaintiff.72 The issue was whether the
plaintiff was entitled to conduct discovery to attempt to elicit an admis-
sion from defendant to establish an exception to the writing requirement
underU.C.C. section 2-201(3)(b) 73 before having the case dismissed on
motion. Judge Posner acknowledged that there was a division of opinion
among the cases decided under section 2-201(3)(b) as to whether discov-
ery should be permitted to see if an admission would be forthcoming, but
he distinguished this case since here a denial under oath had already been
made:
[W]here as in this case the defendant swears in an affidavit that
there was no contract, we see no point in keeping the lawsuit alive.
Of course the defendant may blurt out an admission in a deposition,
but this is hardly likely, especially since by doing to he may be admit-
ting to having perjured himself in his affidavit. Stranger things have
happened, but remote possibilities do not warrant subjecting the par-
ties and the judiciary to proceedings almost certain to be fu-
tile... [P]laintiff in a suit on a contract within the statute of frauds
should not be allowed to resist a motion to dismiss, backed by an
affidavit that the defendant denies the contract was made, by arguing
that his luck may improve in discovery... [I]t seems to us as it did to
the framers of the Uniform Commercial Code that the statute of
frauds serves an important purpose in a system such as ours that
does not require that all contracts be in writing in order to be en-
forceable and that allows juries of lay persons to decide commercial
cases. The methods of judicial fact finding do not distinguish unerr-
69. See Herbert, supra note 46.
70. 851 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988).
71. Failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
72. DF Activities Corp., 851 F.2d at 921.
73. The case was decided under Illinois law whose version of U.C.C. section 2-
201(3)(b) was in line with the uniform text, providing that despite the absence of a signed
writing, a contract for sale of goods was enforceable "if the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for
sale was made .. " Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b)(1995).
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ingly between true and false testimony, and are in any event very
expensive. People deserve some protection against the risks and
costs of being hauled into court and accused of owing money on the
basis of an unacknowledged promise.74
Ruling on a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion whose
basis is failure to satisfy the statute of frauds before allowing the propo-
nent of the agreement to engage in discovery is a reasonable accommoda-
tion of the concerns of those in favor of retaining the statute of frauds.
The authenticated record requirement will remain a useful way to dispose
of meritless cases at an early stage before further anticipated expense
forces a settlement.
13. Applicability to Contract Modifications
Proposed section 2-209(c) is essentially the same as original section 2-
209(3).75 Original comment 3 would also be retained in substantially sim-
ilar language. 76 Original subsection 2-209(3) is not a model for clarity,77
and the revision clarifies nothing. 78 Consider the following possible
situations:
74. 851 F.2d at 922-23.
75. Original subsection 2-209(3) reads, "The requirements of the statute of frauds sec-
tion of this Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its
provisions." U.C.C. § 2-209(3) (1995)(emphasis added). The proposed revised subsection
2-209(c) deletes the introductory phrase and substitutes "subject to" for "within;" it reads:
"Section 2-201 must be satisfied if the contract as modified is subject to its provisions."
U.C.C. § 2-209(c)(2000)(emphasis added.
76. The first two paragraphs of original comment 3 read:
Subsections (2) and (3) are intended to protect against false allegations of
oral modifications. "Modification or rescission" includes abandonment or
other change by mutual consent, contrary to the decision in Green v.
Doniger, 300 N.Y. 238, 90 N.E.2d 56 (1949); it does not include unilateral
"termination" or "cancellation" as defined in Section 2-106.
The Statute of Frauds provisions of this Article are expressly applied to
modifications by subsection (3). Under those provisions the "delivery and
acceptance" test is limited to the goods, which have been accepted, that is, to
the past. "Modification" for the future cannot therefore be conjured up by
oral testimony if the price involved is $500.00 or more since such modifica-
tion must be shown at least by an authenticated memo. And since a memo is
limited in its effect to the quantity of goods set forth in it there is safeguard
against oral evidence.
U.C.C. § 2-209, cmt. 3 (1995).
The only substantive change made in proposed revised comment 3 is to substitute
"$5,000.00" in place of the original "$500.00." The citation to Green v. Doniger is also
omitted and "authenticated record" is substituted for "authenticated memo." See U.C.C.
§ 2-209, cmt. 3 (Proposed Draft 2000).
77. See Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 186 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 1999)
("The interpretation of [U.C.C. § 2-209(3)] ... has generated controversy among courts
and commentators. One view is that all contract modifications must be in writing; another
view is that only modifications of terms that are required to be in writing under U.C.C. § 2-
201 must be in writing.") Cf. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. World Wide Licensing Corp., 898
P.2d 347, 351 (1995) ("The plain language of U.C.C. §2-209(3) only requires a satisfaction
of the statute if the 'contract as modified' is within the statute; it does not require a satis-
faction for the modification itself"). Costco holds that a price modification need not satisfy
the statute of frauds, but that a modification increasing the quantity would be enforceable
only up to the quantity shown in a qualifying writing.
78. See J. WLADiS Article in this Issue discussing proposed revised section 2-209(c).
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(1) Suppose an enforceable original agreement to purchase goods,
having a contract price of $5,000 or more, is modified by the parties orally
agreeing to the purchase and sale of additional goods. Under the pro-
posed revision (as under the original) this modification would have to
satisfy the statute of frauds; the contract as modified is subject to the
statute (the price still exceeds $5,000) and the modification increased the
quantity of goods.79 But suppose as a result of the quantity modification
the price only increased to $5,100. Is it cost-effective to the seller to re-
duce the modification to an authenticated record and obtain the buyer's
signature, or to send a confirmation and rely on the merchant's confirma-
tion exception? 80 Maybe not. According to Hawkland, the price level for
application of the statute of frauds is set where the economy might suffer
if contracts for a lower price were required to be evidenced by an authen-
ticated record.81 In other words the triggering price for the statute to
apply should be set by considering the point at which the costs of satisfy-
ing the statute are probably higher on the average than the risk of non-
enforcement plus the risk of enforcement of terms not agreed to and not
intended. Proposed comment 1 of Revised section 2-209 states the goal is
to "protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications
of sales contracts without undue regard for technicalities."82 It may well
be an "undue regard for technicalities" to require an authenticated re-
cord to enforce some modifications producing only a one-hundred-dollar
change in price, and it may certainly "hamper such adjustments, '83 be-
cause satisfying the statute may not be cost-effective.
(2) What about the situation in which the original contract price is
$4,999 or less and the modification will raise the price by less than $5,000?
Whether the modification must be in the form of an authenticated record
is not clear. There is authority that the statute of frauds must now be
satisfied because the contract equals or exceeds the price limit for the
first time, and this seems to be a natural reading of proposed section 2-
209(c) and of the original version.84 If the original contract price was
$4,950, for example, and the modification was for $50 or more, the total
value of the contract now for the first time equals or exceeds the $5,000
floor of section 2-201(a). When the contract as modified equals or ex-
ceeds a price of $5,000 for the first time it may be cost-effective for the
parties to be required to satisfy the statute of frauds, and it is consistent
79. See Zemco,186 F.3d at 819-820. Under section 2-201(a) and the comments (both
original and revised) the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity shown in the
authenticated record. See supra, notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
80. See Part A 6, supra.
81. See HAWKLAND, supra note 23, and accompanying text.
82. U.C.C. § 2-209, cmt. 1 (Proposed Draft 2000) (emphasis added). Cf. U.C.C. § 2-
209, cmt. 1 (1995) (stating "without regard to the technicalities which at present hamper
such adjustments.") U.C.C. § 2-209, comment 1 (1995).
83. Id.
84. 1 WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 39. Professors White and Summers
state their belief that this interpretation is justified for original section 2-209(3) but do not
cite case authority. But see Costco, 898 P.2d at 351.
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with the selection of the $5,000 price level as the triggering amount; but
on the other hand, it may not be cost-effective to reduce a mere $50 mod-
ification to an authenticated record or otherwise satisfy the statute.
(3) Suppose the original agreement is for a price less than $5,000, thus
does not require an authenticated record. A modification that itself has a
value equal to or exceeding $5,000 would apparently have to satisfy sec-
tion 2-201,85 and it would presumably be cost-effective for the parties to
do so.
If these results are intended from the statute, it would be preferable to
state this directly in the text by modifying proposed 2-209(c) to read: "A
modification must satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds if the
modification itself is for the price of $5,000 or more, or increases the
quantity of goods by $5,000 or more, or if the contract price as modified
exceeds $5,000 for the first time."
Even this language still leaves unresolved questions. Suppose the origi-
nal contract price exceeded $5,000 and the authenticated record require-
ment was satisfied. Then suppose a modification postpones the delivery
date, a term not directly affecting quantity or price. Must the modifica-
tion satisfy the statute of frauds? There is case authority under the cur-
rent statute that it must,8 6 and this may be the position of a majority of
jurisdictions. 87 But there is also authority that only a change in consider-
ation or a change in quantity must satisfy the statute, because only the
quantity term must be written and the price level is the triggering
mechanism. 88
It is regrettable that the proposed revision fails to resolve any of the
uncertainties in current section 2-209(3).
II. PART B
A. SECTION 2-202. PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
1. Introduction
The proposed revision of section 2-202(a) is essentially a restatement of
original Article 2's parol evidence rule (insofar as it deals with the admis-
sibility of evidence offered to contradict or supplement the terms of an
agreement), together with the incorporation of part of former comment
1(c) and with more guidance in the suggested comments on the procedu-
ral aspects of the rule. 89 The proposed revision adds subsection (b) to
85. Costco, 898 P.2d at 350-51.
86. Green Constr. Co. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp 1254 (D. New
Jersey 1990), affirmed 935 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir. 1991).
87. Zemco, 186 F.3d at 819.
88. Id. at 820.
89. Proposed section 2-202 as contained in the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) 2000 annual meeting draft on which these remarks are
based reads:
SECTION 2-202. PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.
(a) Terms with respect to which the confirmatory records of the parties agree
or which are otherwise set forth in a record intended by the parties as a final
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deal separately with the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain
terms, as opposed to contradicting or supplementing them. The proposed
comments provide additional help on how a court determines that a par-
ticular record is a partial or total integration of the parties' agreement.
2. Intent Determines When the Rule Applies
Proposed subsection 2-202(a) states the basic parol evidence rule and
suggested comment 1 explains that the operation of the rule depends on
the intention of the parties that the terms in a record or records are the
"final expression of their agreement with respect to the included
terms." 90 Absent this mutual intent no exclusionary rule applies. This
intent may be ascertained from the circumstances including the presence
of a merger clause.91
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be supplemented by evidence of:(1) course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade; and
(2) consistent additional terms unless the court finds the record to have
been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement.
(b) Terms in a record may be explained by evidence of course of perform-
ance, course of dealing, or usage of trade without a preliminary determina-
tion by the court that the language used is ambiguous.
U.C.C. § 2-202 (Proposed Draft 2000).
90. Suggested comment 1 reads:
1. Subsection (a) codifies the parol evidence rule, the operation of which
depends upon the intention of both parties that terms in a record are the
"final expression of their agreement with respect to the included terms."
Without this mutual intention to integrate the record, the parol evidence rule
does not apply to exclude other terms allegedly agreed to prior to or contem-
poraneously with the writing. Unless there is a final writing, these alleged
terms are provable as part of the agreement by relevant evidence from any
credible source. Where each party sends a confirmatory record, mutual in-
tention to integrate is presumed with regard to terms "with respect to which
the confirmatory records of the parties agree."
U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 1 (Proposed Draft 2000).
91. Suggested comments 2 and 3 read:
2. [The fact that] a record is final with respect to the included terms (an
integration) does not mean that the parties intended that the record contain
all the terms of their agreement (a total integration). If a record is final but
not complete and exclusive it cannot be contradicted by evidence of prior
agreements reflected in a record or prior or contemporaneous oral agree-
ments, but it can be supplemented by evidence, drawn from any source, of
consistent additional terms. Even if the record is final, complete and exclu-
sive it can be supplemented by evidence of noncontradictory terms drawn
from an applicable course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of
trade unless those sources are carefully negated by a term in the record. If
the record is final, complete and exclusive it cannot be supplemented by evi-
dence of terms drawn from other sources, even terms that are consistent with
the record.
3. Whether a writing is final, and whether a final writing is also complete, are
issues for the court. This section rejects any assumption that because a re-
cord has been worked out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as
including all the matters agreed upon. If the additional terms are such that, if
agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the document in the
view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from
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3. Merger Clauses
As proposed comment 3 states, "This section takes no position on the
evidentiary strength of a merger clause as evidence of a mutual intent
that the record be final and complete since that depends upon the partic-
ular circumstances involved."' 92 In other words it would still be possible to
prove that the merger clause did not in fact state the intent of all parties.
An example would be Sierra Diesel Injection Service, Inc. v. Burroughs
Corporation,93 where the signed contract contained a merger clause stat-
ing, "This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement, understanding
and representations, express or implied ... and ... supercedes all prior
communications between the parties .... ,,94 However, the District Court
held, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that integration is a question of
the intent of the parties. Despite the presence of the merger clause, the
buyer did not have the requisite intent to exclude from the contract ex-
press warranties contained in a letter from seller predating the signing of
the agreement.
4. Intent Proved Inferentially
Proposed comment 3 contains the statement:
This section rejects any assumption that because a record has been
worked out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as includ-
ing all the matters agreed upon. If the additional terms are such that,
if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the docu-
ments in the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making
must be kept from the trier of fact. This section takes no position on
the evidentiary strength of a merger clause as evidence of a mutual
intent that the record be final and complete since that depends upon
the particular circumstances involved.95
Proposed comment 2 states in part, "[The fact that] a record is final
with respect to the included terms (an integration) does not mean that
the parties intended that the record contains all the terms of their agree-
ment (a total integration). ' 96 And proposed comment 1 contains the sen-
tence: "Where each party sends a confirmatory record, mutual intention
to integrate is presumed with regard to terms 'with respect to which the
confirmatory records of the parties agree.'" 97
the trier of fact. This section takes no position on the evidentiary strength of
a merger clause as evidence of a mutual intent that the record be final and
complete since that depends upon the particular circumstances involved.
U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 2,3 (Proposed Draft 2000). Proposed comment 3 is similar to the text
of original comment 3.
92. U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 3 (Proposed Draft 2000).
93. Sierra Diesel Injection Serv., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., Inc., 890 F.2d 108 (9th Cir.
1989).
94. The text of the merger clause in Sierra Diesel can be found in the District Court's
opinion. Sierra Diesel, 656 F. Supp 426, 428 (D. Nev. 1987).
95. See full text of proposed comment 3, supra note 91.
96. See full text of proposed comment 2, supra note 91.
97. See full text of proposed comment 1, supra note 90.
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Taken together these comments indicate that the intent of the parties
must be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. What should be
considered? Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,98 listed five relevant fac-
tors in determining the intent of the parties: (1) the presence of a merger
clause in the writing, (2) the presence of warranty disclaimers (in this case
where parol evidence was offered to prove a warranty not contained in
the writing), (3) whether the extrinsic term was one the parties would
certainly have included in the writing if it were in fact part of their final
agreement, (4) the sophistication of the parties, and (5) the nature and
scope of prior negotiations and of the offered extrinsic terms.99
The first sentence of proposed 2-202(a) says, "Terms with respect to
which the confirmatory records of the parties agree or which are otherwise
set forth in a record intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporane-
ous oral agreement."'100 For example, if the confirmatory records of the
parties both state the price at $50 per unit there is a strong inference that
the parties have reached a final agreement on that price, but is it conclu-
sive? This statutory language is retained from the original with only the
substitution of the word "records" for "memoranda" and "record" for
"writing." Under original section 2-202 some courts construed this lan-
guage to mean the inference is conclusive as to matters on which the par-
ties' records agree. 101 The language of the proposed text, almost identical
to the original, says the terms "may not be contradicted," and it would be
very difficult to read that as anything but a conclusive inference of inte-
gration as to terms on which the parties' records agree.
98. Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 103 F.3d 1281 (7th Cir. 1996). This is the
second Betaco case. The first one is cited infra note 104.
99. Id. at 1286.
100. U.C.C. § 2-202(a)(Proposed Draft 2000)(emphasis added).
101. Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 42 (N.D. 111.1970).
("Under the unambiguous wording of this provision [2-202]... plaintiff can
only clarify uncertain terms of the contract in light of usage of the trade or
prove consistent additional terms. Plaintiff cannot, however, disavow a term
of the contract by evidence of an alleged prior oral agreement when there exist
subsequent confirmatory memoranda between the parties which are entirely
consistent with each other.")(Emphasis added). The case also demonstrates
the interaction between original sections 2-207(3) and 2-202 and that the
same result may have been dictated by both sections. Original section 2-
207(3) reads:
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties
do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, to-
gether with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provi-
sions of this Act.
U.C.C. § 2-207(3)(1998)(emphasis added).
See also Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1047 (I11. App. Ct
1980), ("Terms contained in a confirmatory memorandum by one party does [sic] not pre-
clude parol evidence contradicting those terms unless such terms are also found in a confir-
matory memorandum by the other party to the contract.").
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What is to be made then of the suggestion in proposed comment 1 that
there is a presumption of integration where the "confirmatory records of
the parties agree"? 10 2 At least three situations might justify a court in
using a presumption of integration: (1) when the record to which the par-
ties have assented appears complete on its face, e.g., a fifty-page written
contract signed by both parties; 10 3 (2) when a record contains a merger
clause, e.g., a form contract prepared by one of the parties and signed by
the other, which has a merger term included; 10 4 and (3) where the "con-
firmatory records of the parties agree."
Presumably (pardon the expression) the comment writer of suggested
comment 1 had in mind the definition of "presumption" in existingU.C.C.
section 1-201(31)105 when penning the comment. But that definition indi-
cates the presumption is never conclusive, because it anticipates that evi-
dence will be admitted in an attempt to overcome the presumption. So in
the third possible situation mentioned above (taken from the first line of
the proposed section) it is probably not correct to speak of a presump-
tion, since the statute apparently means that the inference of integration
is conclusive.' 06 It is not clear that it adds anything to say in the first two
situations above that there is a presumption of integration. The inference
of integration from the circumstances is so strong in those cases that a
finding of merger would probably occur in any event in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, and saying there is a presumption, thus requir-
ing a finding of integration in the absence of such evidence seems point-
less. Additionally, according to Professor Farnsworth the issue of
integration is generally treated as a question of law for the judge to de-
cide rather than the jury, since it goes to the admissibility of evidence. 0 7
Proposed comment 3 is consistent with this approach. 10 8 Original com-
102. U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 1 (Proposed Draft 2000).
103. Cf. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcrs § 7.3, at 475 (2d ed.1990)("Some writ-
ings, such as elaborately drafted agreements signed by both parties, suggest complete inte-
gration .... ").
104. In Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., among the "General Terms" on the reverse
side of the form Purchase Agreement used by seller, Cessna Aircraft Company, and signed
by buyer, Betaco, was the clause "This agreement is the only agreement controlling this
purchase and sale, express or implied, either verbal or in writing, and is binding on Pur-
chaser and Seller .... Betaco, 32 F.3d 1126, 1129 (7th Cir. 1994). (This is the first Betaco
opinion.)
105. "Presumption" or "presumed" means that the trier of fact must find the existence
of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding
of its non-existence. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(1998).
106. See supra text accompanying note 95.
107. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, § 7.3, at 478 ("[M]ost courts favor resolution of
these issues by the trial court before the evidence goes to the jury.") See also WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 2-9, at 86,
("[T]he trial is certainly not to be a free-wheeling affair in which the parties
may introduce before the jury all evidence of terms, including the writing,
with the jury then to decide on terms. Rather, it is plain from the rule and
from prior history of similar rules that some of the evidence is to be heard
initially only by the judge and that the judge may invoke the rule to keep this
evidence from the jury.")
108. See first sentence of proposed comment 3, supra note 89.
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ment 3 of section 2-202 suggested this approach in its last sentence: "If
the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly
have been included in the document in the view of the court, then evi-
dence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact."'10 9
This language has been retained in proposed comment 3.110 A court may
be less in need of guidance from a presumption than a jury. It seems
preferable to remove from the comments any reference to a presumption
of integration, especially since the last sentence of proposed comment 3
declines to raise a presumption from the presence of a merger clause and
the second sentence rejects any "assumption that because a record has
been worked out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as in-
cluding all the matters agreed upon.""'1
5. Effect of Partial Integration
In the case of a partial integration of the agreement into a record or
records, terms as to which there is such integration may not be contra-
dicted but may be supplemented by consistent additional terms. 112 Sug-
gested comment 3113 would continue the concept of original comment
3114 that in determining whether evidence of such terms is admissible, the
court is to consider the likelihood that the offered term would have been
included in the writing if it had in fact been agreed to. If the court con-
cludes that the offered term, "if agreed upon.. .would have certainly been
included in the document," evidence of the term is not admissible.11 5 In
part, the finding that the term probably would have been included is a
finding that the record or records are integrated as to the subject matter
with which the offered term deals; but there is also an element of credibil-
ity here: the court finding that the term certainly would have been in-
cluded, if agreed to, is a finding that the evidence is not credible. 116
Suggested comment 4 of the NCCUSL 1999 Annual Meeting draft of
section 2-202 gave an example of a contract without a merger clause
where the records agree on a term fixing the unit price at $500, and evi-
dence is offered to prove that the parties in their negotiations agreed to
109. U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 3 (1998).
110. U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 3 (Proposed Draft 1998).
111. Id.
112. Proposed section 2-202(a) first speaks to "[t]erms with respect to which the confir-
matory records of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a record intended by
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are in-
cluded therein ...... U.C.C. § 2-202(a)(Proposed Draft 2000)(emphasis added.) As to
those terms there is at least a partial integration and the parol evidence rule prohibits
contradiction by prior agreements or contemporaneous oral agreements.
113. Supra note9l.
114. The second sentence of original comment 3 reads: "If the additional terms are such
that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the document in the view
of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact."
U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 3 (1998).
115. Supra note 91.
116. Cf. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 2-9, 87 ("[Tihe judge may decide that the
proffered evidence of terms extrinsic to the writing is not credible, and he or she may
exclude it on that ground alone."
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an upward price escalation term under certain conditions. That comment
indicated such evidence would be admissible if it "does not contradict the
fixed price term," and "if it is a consistent additional term."11 7 That com-
ment has been dropped from the current draft and would have been more
clear if it said the evidence was admissible (1) so long as it did not contra-
dict the included fixed price term 118 and (2) if the court did not conclude
that the escalation term, if agreed to, probably [certainly in current draft]
would have been included in the record. However, the example still
seems correct.
Proposed comment 2 states, "If a record is final but not complete and
exclusive it cannot be contradicted by evidence of prior agreements re-
flected in a record or prior or contemporaneous oral agreements, but it
can be supplemented by evidence, drawn from any source, of consistent
additional terms."'119 A partial integration thus excludes parol evidence
only of inconsistent additional terms alleged to have been part of the ac-
tual agreement of the parties. Evidence of course performance, course of
dealing, and usage of trade is not excluded.
6. Effect of Total Integration
If the court finds the parties intended the record to be the complete
and exclusive statement of all the terms of their agreement, proposed
subsection 2-202(a) provides the record may not be contradicted or sup-
plemented by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous
oral agreement. The finding of complete integration of all terms into the
record automatically renders evidence of other agreed terms irrelevant.
However, it is still possible the terms in the record may be supplemented
(but not contradicted) by evidence of course of dealing, trade usage, or
course of performance.
Suggested comment 3 of the NCCUSL 1999 Annual Meeting draft of 2-
202 contained an example of a totally integrated contract with a fixed
117. The pertinent part of suggested comment 4 of the NCCUSL 1999 Annual Meeting
draft stated: PARTIAL INTEGRATION. For example, if a term does not contradict but is
additional to a partially integrated record, the court might conclude that the term is not a
consistent additional term or, if agreed to, probably would have been included in the re-
cord. If so, evidence of the term is not admissible.
* * * If the plaintiff claims that the parties agreed to a $600 price term in the pre-contract
negotiations, that evidence will be excluded. The price term in the integrated record can-
not be contradicted by evidence of a prior agreement.
If the plaintiff claims that the parties agreed to an upward escalation in the pre-contract
negotiations and this evidence does not contradict the fixed price term, the evidence is
admissible if it is a consistent additional term. If so [sic], and this depends upon inferences
from the circumstances, the evidence is excluded.
The record, even if partially integrated, may be supplemented by course of performance,
usage of trade, or course of dealing.
U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 4 (Proposed Draft 2000).
118. Such contradiction would occur, for example, if the recorded price term stated
"The parties do not agree to any price adjustment under any circumstances."
119. Supra note 91.
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price term. °20 Extrinsic evidence of a prior or contemporaneous agree-
ment for upward price escalation under certain conditions would be ex-
cluded, but evidence of a trade usage meeting the requirements of section
1-205 that price escalation would be available would be admissible to sup-
plement the contract terms. While that suggested comment has also been
dropped from the current version, again the example still seems correct.
Comment 2 of original section 2-202 indicated that inclusion of terms
from established trade usages was taken for granted by the parties when
the record was prepared. 12' Original comment 2 made the same point
about inclusion of terms from course of dealing and there is no reason to
suppose the revision intended to depart from that concept, especially
when the text of the revision expressly mentions supplementation, even
of a totally integrated contract, by course of dealing, trade usage and
course of performance. In the example above taken from the suggested
comment in the 1999 version, evidence would be admissible that the par-
ties had in past dealings under similar fixed price contracts afforded price
escalation to the seller in certain circumstances, again because such sup-
plementation of the terms in the record was probably taken for
granted. 122
120. The pertinent part of suggested comment 3 to section 2-202 of the 1999 NCCUSL
Annual Meeting draft reads:
The effect of a total integration is clear under subsection (a). The record may not be
contradicted or supplemented by "evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporane-
ous oral agreement." Alleged terms from these sources are excluded even though they are
perfectly consistent or are in harmony with those in the record. However, terms may be
supplemented by evidence of course of performance, usage of trade, and course of per-
formance [sic, presumably course of dealing was intended]. Thus, unless carefully negated
in the merger term, evidence from trade usage may always be admitted to supplement a
term in the record. The conditions of Section 1-205, however, must be satisfied.
To illustrate, suppose that a totally integrated record contains a fixed price term. An
alleged term agreed in the negotiations to provide upward price escalation if certain costs
increased would be excluded even though it merely supplemented the fixed price. On the
other hand, a usage of trade otherwise established under Section 1-205 that price escalation
is available under certain conditions would be admitted to supplement the price term un-
less specifically excluded. The assumption is that the inclusion of terms from this source
was taken for granted when the record was prepared.
U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 3 (1999).
121. The text of original comment 2 states:
Paragraph (a) makes admissible evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade and course
of performance to ... supplement the terms of any writing stating the agreement of the
parties in order that the true understanding of the parties as to the agreement may be
reached. Such writings are to be read on the assumption that the course of prior dealings
between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted when the document
was phrased. Unless carefully negated they have become an element of the meaning of the
words used. Similarly, the course of actual performance by the parties is considered the
best indication of what they intended the writing to mean.
Except for the sentence concerned with negation of course of dealing, course of per-
formance, or trade usage, these statements from original comment 2 are not retained in the
proposed new comments. The omission is not explained and is regrettable since these
statements remain as true today as when original Article 2 was drafted.
U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 2 (1998).
122. Cf. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).
(price protection for buyer implied from trade usage and course of performance).
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One of the best benefits from the proposed revision of section 2-202 is
the way deals with distinct concepts somewhat more precisely than the
original version, separating supplementation of terms from explanation of
terms and separating evidence of supplementation by agreement from ev-
idence of supplementation from trade usage, course of dealing and course
of performance.
7. Excluding Evidence of Course of Dealing, Course of Performance,
or Trade Usage
The parties to an agreement may wish to go beyond a standard merger
clause stating, for example, "This record is a final expression of all the
terms of the agreement of the parties and is a complete and exclusive
statement of those terms." Such a merger term, if found by the court to
state the intentions of the parties, would still not have precluded intro-
duction of evidence of course of dealing, course of performance, or trade
usage, because subsection (a) of proposed section 2-202 indicates that
such evidence is still admissible to supplement the terms in the record,
and subsection (b) indicates that evidence of course of performance,
course of dealing or usage of trade may be admitted to explain terms in a
record. Proposed comment 2 states in part, "Even if the record is final,
complete and exclusive it can be supplemented by evidence of noncon-
tradictory terms drawn from an applicable course of performance, course
of dealing or usage of trade unless those sources are carefully negated by
a term in the record"'123 The rationale as expressed in comment 2 of origi-
nal section 2-202 was that the parties are assumed to have negotiated the
contract and prepared the record with the expectation that supplemen-
tary terms from these sources would be included. 124 Language such as,
"The parties do not intend for the terms in this record to be supple-
mented [or explained] by course of dealing, course of performance, or
usage of trade," should be sufficient, though obviously the parties should
think carefully and make sure they have a complete statement in the re-
cord of all their expectations before including such language, especially
the bracketed words which purport even exclude course of dealing,
course of performance, and trade usage from being admitted to explain
the meaning of terms. 125
Course of performance may be treated somewhat differently from
course of dealing or trade usage because performance comes after the
contract is agreed to and recorded. As a result course of performance
may be admissible to prove subsequently-agreed-to modifications or
waivers. 26 Of course section 2-209 would have to be satisfied as to proof
123. Supra note 91.
124. Supra note 121.
125. See HAWKLAND, supra note 23, § 2-202:3 (discussing express negation of these
sources). See also, text of suggested comment 5 questioning whether a contract clause may
exclude "an otherwise applicable implied-in-fact source." Infra, note 136.
126. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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of modification or waiver.127 But under revised section 2-202(a) course
of performance would still not be admissible to prove a contradictory
prior or contemporaneously-agreed-to term, and proposed section 2-208
must be satisfied as to evidence of course of performance introduced for
other permitted purposes.
8. Article 2 "Gap-Fillers"
The parol evidence rule has no application to Article 2's gap-filling pro-
visions such as section 2-305 on open price terms or section 2-308 specify-
ing the place for delivery. These are not prior or contemporaneous
agreements but terms (sometimes called default terms) that will apply as
a matter of law to the extent the parties do not provide otherwise.
9. Evidence Offered to Explain Terms
The proposed new rule would add clarity in subsection (b) by treating
separately the admissibility of evidence to explain terms. This provision
makes it clear that course of dealing, course of performance, and trade
usage may be used to explain terms in a record without a preliminary
finding by the judge that the term is ambiguous; 128 this follows former
section 2-202(a) and original comment 1(c). Of course it is not always
easy to tell the difference between supplementation and explanation. For
example, suppose a contract term in a record at least partially integrated
says the goods are to be "delivered by March 18." Seller attempted a
partial delivery on March 10, planning to complete performance with a
further delivery on March 17. Buyer rejected the partial delivery because
the record did not provide for partial deliveries and proposed section 2-
307 would have required one single delivery.129 Evidence is offered to
establish a trade usage (or a course of dealing) under which the partial
delivery would have been acceptable. Is the evidence being offered to
add a supplemental term (that partial deliveries will be acceptable) or to
explain that "delivered by March 18," means that partial deliveries will be
acceptable as long as full delivery is completed by that date? In the latter
case the evidence is admissible; but in the former it is not if the court
either finds that there was an integration as to the delivery term, or finds
127. See J. WLADis article in this issue dealing with contract formation and section 2-
209.
128. See text of subsection 2-202(b), supra. The Preliminary Comment to the proposed
revision reads:
Changes: In subsection (a), the word "explained" has been deleted. This
makes it clear that subsection (a) applies only to issues of supplementation,
not interpretation. Subsection (b), which is new, permits terms in a record to
be explained by evidence derived from an implied-in-fact source without a
preliminary determination by the court that the language at issue is
ambiguous.
U.C.C. § 2-202, preliminary cmt. (Proposed Draft 2000) (emphasis added).
129. The pertinent part of proposed section 2-307 reads: "Unless otherwise agreed all
goods called for by a contract for sale must be tendered in a single delivery ...." U.C.C.
§ 2-307 (Proposed Draft 2000).
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that the offered term, if agreed upon, would certainly have been included
in the record.
As one commentator points out 130 the Code's definition of "term" pro-
vides some guidance. "'Term' means that portion of an agreement which
relates to a particular matter. ' 131 Hawkland suggests, "a term is not com-
pletely stated unless all of its aspects are covered. For example, a deliv-
ery term that states only the time and place of delivery is not complete,
because it has not dealt with the manner of delivery. It may be said in
such a case that there is a 'missing' or 'silent' term (manner of delivery)
which may be supplemented by evidence outside of the contract. '132 Ac-
cording to this view, in the example above involving partial delivery the
evidence would be attempting to supplement the record with a further
term covering the number of deliveries permitted. Whether the evidence
is admissible would depend on whether the court found that there was a
complete integration as to the terms dealing with the subject matter of
delivery and whether supplementation by trade usage or course of deal-
ing had been "carefully negated. '133
"Under the newer, more liberal view, championed by Corbin and fol-
lowed by the Restatement, Second, [of Contracts], the parol evidence
rule does not apply at all to matters of interpretation. ' 134 Proposed sub-
section (c) of the NCCUSL 1999 Annual Meeting draft of 2-202 con-
tained a sentence stating, "Terms in a record may also be explained from
other sources as determined by the court under applicable law." A sug-
gested comment, which was not retained, said in part, "Terms in a record
may also be explained by evidence from other sources as determined by
the court under applicable law. Put differently, Section 2-202 does not
state the principles of contract interpretation beyond those provided in
subsection (c) [now (b)]."'1 35 Although the textual provision and the
comment have not been retained, the rule they stated seems to be cor-
rect. 136 Nonetheless suggested comment 5 of the current version takes a
130. See HAWKLAND, supra note 23, at § 2-202:3.
131. U.C.C. § 1-201(42) (1998).
132. See HAWKLAND, supra note 23, at § 2-202:3 (emphasis added).
133. See supra Parts B. 6 & 7 of this article.
134. FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, at 522. (footnotes omitted). The quote continues:
Integrated and unintegrated agreements are treated alike, and extrinsic evidence of prior
negotiations is always admissible as long as it is used for the purpose of interpretation. The
court need not first determine that the language is unclear .... In Corbin's words, "No
parol evidence that is offered can be said to vary or contradict a writing until by process of
interpretation the meaning of the writing is determined."Id. (quoting Corbin, The Parol
Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 622 (1944), adapted in 3 A. CORBIN, CONTIACrs § 579
(1960).
135. U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 5 (Proposed Draft 1999) (citing RESTATEMENT(SECOND), OF
CONTRACrS, §§ 212, 200-203, and Margaret N Kniffen, A New Trend in Contract Interpre-
tation: The Search for Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OREGON L. REV. 643
(1995).
136. Cf WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 103-4 ("It is well understood that the
parol evidence rule does not bar evidence bearing on a genuine issue of interpretation
arising because of ambiguity or other unclarity. Some courts require that the term to be
interpreted be ambiguous on its face, though 2-202 does not so provide.") (footnotes
omitted).
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more conservative approach. 137 The last sentence of this proposed com-
ment 5 appears to contradict the next to last sentence of proposed com-
ment 2, which suggests that a term in a record could "carefully negate"
(exclude) application of course of performance, course of dealing, or
trade usage.138 It is possible that comment 2 is addressing only supple-
mentation of the record, in which case the parties may agree to the exclu-
sion of implied-in-fact terms. Comment 5, on the other hand, addresses
only interpretation, and declines to state a rule on whether the parties
could also validly agree that implied-in-fact terms are excluded from as-
sisting in contract interpretation. 139 Again it is not always easy to tell the
difference between "interpreting," "contradicting," and
"supplementing." 140
10. Evidence of Fraud, Mistake, Duress, ETC.
Finally, suggested comment 4 would preserve the cases under original
section 2-202 holding that the parol evidence rule does not exclude evi-
dence offered to establish a variety of matters including misrepresenta-
tion, duress, mistake, unconscionability, modification, and
impracticability. 141 The goal of the parol evidence rule is to assist in find-
ing and enforcing the actual agreement of the parties, taking into account
that a record is considered to be a more reliable indication of that agree-
ment than the memory of the parties. All these exceptions are in keeping
with that goal.
137. The text of suggested comment 5 reads:
Issues of interpretation are generally left to the courts. In interpreting terms
in a record, subsection (b) permits either party to introduce evidence drawn
from an implied-in-fact source without any preliminary determination by the
court that the term is ambiguous. The subsection deals with that circum-
stance and no other. It takes no position on whether a preliminary determi-
nation of ambiguity is a condition to the admissibility of evidence drawn
from any other source or on whether a contract clause can exclude an other-
wise applicable implied-in-fact source.
U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 5 (Proposed Draft 2000).
138. See text of suggested comment 2 supra note 91.
139. There is amusing irony in the possibility that the comments to revised section 2-202
may be unclear.
140. FARNSWORTH, supra note 103, at 522-23.
141. The text of suggested comment 4 reads:
This section does not exclude evidence introduced to show that the contract
is avoidable for misrepresentation, mistake, or duress, or that the contract or
a term is unenforceable because of unconscionability. Similarly, this section
does not operate to exclude evidence of a subsequent modification or evi-
dence that, for the purpose of claiming excuse, both parties assumed that a
certain event would not occur.
U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 4 (Proposed Draft 2000).
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